INTRODUCTION
Legionnaire's disease (LD), reported as caused by the bacterium Legionella pneumophila (Lp) in 1977 (McDade et al. 1977 , remains at 30 years later a significant cause of community acquired and nosocomial pneumonia, although doi: 10.2166/wh.2008.026 the actual incidence rates are uncertain (Millar 1997; Fields et al. 2002) . Legionella are widespread, with numerous species and strains found in soils and water supplies throughout the world, and LD is widespread as well (Fliermans et al. 1981; Joly et al. 1984; Korvick et al. 1987; Ortiz-Roque & Hazen 1987; Steele et al. 1990; Zacheus & Martikainen 1994; Koide et al. 2001; Riffard et al. 2001) .
Given suitable temperature and nutrient conditions, Legionella can amplify in cooling towers, hot water distribution systems, and other water-containing systems. For cooling towers, the basis for the guidance which exists for Legionella control limits is not clearly documented. The guidance apparently evolved from experience, and may largely derive from a study of the counts of Legionella in two cooling towers tied to LD outbreaks versus counts of the bacteria in other cooling towers not associated with outbreaks (Shelton et al. 1994) . The basis for any limits for whirlpool spas, hot water distribution systems, and other potential sources of Legionella exposure are not well described either. Given the seemingly limited basis for the Legionella control guidance, we undertook research on another approach for quantitatively evaluating the risks from Legionella exposure.
In 1983, Haas reported on models to estimate risks from low dose exposure to waterborne bacteria and viruses (Haas 1983) . Since then the QMRA techniques have been applied in many other water and food microbial risk assessments, but less commonly for airborne microbial exposures and risks. Although many investigators reported animal doseresponse data for Legionella since 1976, prior risk assessment reports are generally limited (O'Brien & Bhopal 1993) or qualitative and our research appears to be the first to use the available data and QMRA techniques to model human LD risks from aerosol exposure to the organism. Our QMRA development for LD progressed in three parts. Legionella uptake, survival and replication in that species and human macrophages (Rechnitzer et al. 1992) . Legionella produce LD following intracellular replication in alveolar macrophages, so similar macrophage uptake and replication is a particularly important model selection aspect. In vivo and in vitro macrophage data showed most mouse strains were resistant to Legionella infection (Izu et al. 1999; Wright et al. 2003) . Data for non-human primates were limited (Kishimoto et al. 1979; Baskerville et al. 1983; Jacobs et al. 1984; Dowling et al. 1992) , but also indicated resistance to Legionella infection compared to other susceptible species. Further details on other comparative immune response factors considered and full references on the animal model selection issues are available in a dissertation and conference poster (Armstrong & Haas 2003; Armstrong 2005) .
Following the selection of the Guinea pig model, data for mortality (Baskerville et al. 1981; Fitzgeorge et al. 1983) and non-lethal infection (Muller et al. 1983) were both used with dose-response models. The models evaluated were the exponential, approximate beta-Poisson, exact beta-Poisson, Weibull, logistic and probit. The dose-response modeling work was primarily done in Excel w using Solver for maximum-likelihood optimization of the model parameters (Haas 1994) , with Mathematica w used to a lesser extent.
Each model's fit to the data was evaluated via x 2 techniques (Haas 1994) . Due to their mechanistic basis (Haas et al. 1999), the work primarily relied on the exponential and approximate beta-Poisson models. None of the other models provided an improved fit to the data. The doseresponse models were then used to project human risk at doses below the animal experimental dose ranges. (Blanchard & Syzdek 1970; Quinn et al. 1975; Hejkal et al. 1980; Blanchard & Syzdek 1982; Blanchard 1983; Colbourne et al. 1987; Blanchard 1989; Georgescu et al. 2002) . This potential enrichment was an important consideration in the whirlpool spa exposure assessment. The other two spa outbreaks were for natural thermal spring spas, without active aeration, and a bacterial water-to-air partitioning coefficient was developed and used to estimate exposures.
In this current report, we describe Part 3 of our Legionella QMRA work. That is the evaluation of our QMRA model's predictive adequacy for LD. An extended abstract summarizes the methods and evaluation results (Armstrong & Haas 2006 ) and a doctoral dissertation covers the whole of the research (Armstrong 2005) .
Infection with Legionella (dominantly Legionella pneumophila) in humans produces a range of outcomes, possibly due to variable ranges of exposure, variations in human susceptibility, and variations in the virulence of the Legionella organism with the strains or growth conditions. These infection outcomes include: † Pontiac Fever (Kaufmann et al. 1981) , a febrile illness with no associated mortality † Apparently silent (or sub-clinical severity) Legionella infections (Lattimer et al. 1979; Boshuizen et al. 2001 ) † Severe clinical manifestations of Legionnaires' disease (Edelstein & Meyer 1984) including pneumonia and typically, for a fraction of those ill with LD, mortality.
This "clinical severity" stage of LD would generally involve hospitalization and supportive medical care.
Given the different disease stages possible, we used different guinea pig exposure reports (Baskerville et al. 1981; Muller et al. 1983) for the different LD stages. We did not include Pontiac Fever. We modeled the sub-clinical infection rates for humans using data for rates of infection in guinea pigs which recovered (with zero mortality in any dose group) following a fever induced by aerosol exposure to L. pneumophila (Muller et al. 1983) . We used data for the inhalation LD 50% in guinea pigs (Baskerville et al. 1981; Fitzgeorge et al. 1983 ) to model the rates of clinical severity infection and mortality in humans. After initial examination of a wider range of models, we used the exponential and beta-Poisson models for subsequent work (Armstrong 2005; Armstrong & Haas 2007b With the LD QMRA model, for a given level of exposure, the expected risk may then be calculated, or in reverse, for a given level of risk, the dose may be estimated. 
METHODS FOR LD QMRA MODEL EVALUATION
Whirlpool spa outbreak, reported infection rates (Muller et al. 1983 ) and for the clinical severity infection and mortality (Baskerville et al. 1981) .
For the sub-clinical infection and mortality models, we calculated risk estimates using the dose-response modeling approaches summarized above. The resulting rates are as exposure dose-response distributions. Table 3 , but may have little significance given the uncertainties in the underlying assumptions and data. Table 2 shows these rates and calculated confidence intervals. Legionnaires' disease QMRA model. However, the report did state that the Legionella content in the spa water for that outbreak ranged from 1.3 £ 10 6 to 1.5 £ 10 7 CFU/litre and is consistent with the Legionella concentrations found in the Miyazaki outbreak described above.
Hot spring spa risk calculations
Using the exposure dose probability distributions (summarized in Table 5 ) and dose-response modeling summarized above, we calculated infection risk probability distributions for the two hot springs outbreaks.
RESULTS
Whirlpool spa outbreak risk calculations The reported rates of sub-clinical infection fall into the range of the calculated risk distributions, as shown in Table 4 and reported mean falling at the 9th and 40th percentile of the calculated risk distribution.
The presumption that the model developed from the guinea pig mortality data predicts clinical severity disease in humans appears not to hold with risks calculated using the exposure assumptions applied for this whirlpool spa outbreak evaluation. As shown in Table 4 These metrics are estimated as discussed in Results. The West Frisian , 15 metre calculated subclinical infection rate is lower than reported, the calculated clinical rate is lower than reported, and lower than the projected mortality rate. The West Frisian .15 metre calculated subclinical infection rate is lower than reported, the calculated clinical infection rate is lower than reported, and lower than the projected mortality rate.
Miyazaki prefecture outbreak
infection risk is higher than the estimated sub-clinical risk but is within an order of magnitude. The estimates of clinical severity risk overlap the reported clinical infection rate at the 99th percentile, as summarized in Table 6 .
However, for this outbreak report, the calculated clinical severity rates, although within an order of magnitude, are somewhat higher than the reported mortality.
Legionella QMRA model validation results unnecessary. This difficulty in validating a risk assessment holds even for a relatively well-studied contaminant with extensive human epidemiologic data, such as benzene. For benzene, the underlying exposure assessment components of the risk assessments arguably remain in debate, with the Pliofilm benzene-exposed cohort the subject of at least 4 distinct exposure assessments (Rinsky et al. 1987; Paustenbach et al. 1992; Crump 1996; Williams & Paustenbach 2003) .
What
These exposure assessments on the same workers and factories then led to differing epidemiologic analyses and subsequently differing risk assessments (Paustenbach et al. Quantitative chemical risk assessments often utilize uncertainty factors, such as a factor of up to 10 for sensitivity differences in interspecies extrapolation and another factor of up to 10 for residual scientific uncertainty (Lewis et al. 1990; Dourson et al. 1996; Renwick & Lazarus 1998; Meek et al. 2002) . These factors seemingly indicate that the overall validity may be no closer than within a factor of 10 to 100 of the actual risk. If so, then QMRA vali-dation criteria of "within an order of magnitude" may also be reasonable. Taking that liberty, the current Legionella Table 7 appear to be valid. We review the limits and qualifications on this conclusion in the Discussion section. Development of guidance on the quantitative validation of risk assessments seems to be an area meriting additional research.
QMRA results as summarized in Figures 2-7 and

DISCUSSION Strengths of the findings
The results indicate that the models used for this Legionnaires' disease QMRA are generally adequate to predict the disease experience for the outbreaks evaluated. All predic- species and humans appears to be crucial. This is particularly so for a naive (previously unexposed to the organism)
host's initial cell-mediated immune system response to a pathogen, where significant interspecies differences in alveolar macrophage bactericidal mechanisms and invading bacterial evasion mechanisms can lead to major differences in host organism susceptibility.
Chemical risk assessments often include dose-scaling metrics, to account for body mass driven differences or other scale-based differences in response to a toxicant. The use of dose scaling in QMRA has been the subject of some conjecture. Mechanistic and probability based analysis of bacterial deposition, uptake and replication in alveolar macrophages suggests that dose scaling may be inappropriate for an intracellular pathogen in QMRA (Armstrong 2005; Armstrong & Haas 2007b) . Findings from this QMRA, which do not include dose scaling, appear to support those theoretical arguments. Thus, this Legionnaires' disease QMRA indicates no need for dose scaling for pathogenic organisms which replicate in the host.
The findings of this QMRA suggest that given a virulent organism, the probability of disease ties to the probability of exposure. This implies that a relatively low-level exposure to a virulent bacterial strain, widely distributed among a large population, will yield a burden of disease. For Legionnaires' disease, this implies that, although high-level sources such as contaminated cooling towers can be significant in outbreaks, widespread exposure to lower level sources of a virulent strain could cause elevated LD rates in communities.
Thus, high prevalence exposures to lower level sources may deserve further consideration in outbreak investigations.
Limited research has been done on the community risks of LD over time in relationship to cooling tower or other potential source proximity, although findings (Bhopal & Fallon 1991) suggest this is a contributor to the burden of LD. Given our LD QMRA findings, further study of the geographic clustering of LD cases over time may give insights into the impact of lower-level sources than those associated with frank LD outbreaks, and then give an impetus for revisions on Legionella control guidance.
